How can a rational player strategically control a myopic best reply player in a repeated two-player game? We show that in games with strategic substitutes or strategic complements the optimal control strategy is monotone in the initial action of the opponent and across time periods. As an interesting example outside this class of games we present a Cournot duopoly with non-negative prices and show that in a finite repetition the optimal control strategy involves a cycle.
Introduction
How to strategically interact with others? Answers to this question are given (often dissatisfactory) by non-cooperative solution concepts that presume symmetry in the rationality of players. This symmetry is justified for methodological reasons: We do not want to explain (trivially) ex-post differences in behavior with an assumption of ex-ante differences among the players. Yet, in real-life situations we are often (over)confident in our ability to outwit others. On top of it, more and more we interact with computer programs, which obviously involve an asymmetry in the rationality of the players. For example, calling computers call clients to schedule appointments, businesses may use programmed trading in electronic market platforms etc. Often we view these programs as inferior to human intelligence. After all computers can just do what they are programmed to do. Their response may be inappropriate, limited and suboptimal. Even relatively intelligent machines who are able to learn, must use some kind of learning programm. Such learning algorithm may adapt only slowly or with a lag to the situation, and is prone to strategic teaching and manipulation. Given that the opponent's rationality differs from ours, it may still not be a trivial problem to answer the question of how to interact with such opponent optimally. In particular, how could we manipulate him to our advantage? In this article we will investigate such problem that appears to be straight forward but is to our knowledge neglected in the literature: How can a rational player optimally control an adaptively learning opponent in a repeated strategic game?
For the sake of concreteness, consider a repeated symmetric Cournot duopoly in which a player's one-shot payoff function is given by π(x t , y t ) = max{109 − x t − y t , 0}x t − x t , in which x t ∈ R + (resp. y t ∈ R + ) denotes the action of the player (resp. opponent) in period t. Assume further that the opponent plays a myopic best reply to previous period's quantity of the player,
What is the player's optimal strategy against the opponent? Is there a possibility to strategically manipulate the opponent such that he plays favorable to the player? Of course, this may require that the player forgoes some short-run profit in order to gain more in the long run.
Note that this is a dynamic programming problem that is non-standard in the sense as the object function is not everywhere concave and differentiable, conditions usually required for dynamic programming (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989 ). Nevertheless we initially conjectured that the optimal strategy may involve a (current) best reply in the last period and Stackelberg leadership in the previous periods. However, in an experiment in which human subjects played this game against a computer programmed to myopic best reply (see Dürsch, Kolb, Oechssler and Schipper, 2006) , we discovered to our surprise that the subject who played the following 4-cycle of quantities (upper line in Figure 1 ) obtained a much larger average profit than the Stackelberg leader profit.
1 This experimental discovery triggered the current analysis. Can such a cycle be optimal? Figure 1 : Cycle played by a subject
In this article we will show that if the two-player game satisfies a version of strategic substitutes or strategic complements, namely decreasing or increasing differences, then the optimal control strategy is monotone in the initial action of the opponent and over time periods. Examples of this class of games include some Cournot duopolies, Bertrand duopolies, Common pool resource games, Rent seeking games, Arms race etc. The key idea is to apply methods from lattice programming (Topkis, 1978 (Topkis, , 1998 to dynamic programming (see Topkis, 1978 , Puterman, 1994 , Amir, 1995 . It turns out that our problem is analogous to a Ramsey-type capital accumulation problem solved in Amir (1995) , so that his results if appropriately "translated" can be applied to our game theoretic problem. Note that above example of the Cournot duopoly does not satisfy decreasing or increasing differences everywhere, which is caused by insisting on a nonnegative price (see section 3). Yet, we show how to use our general results in order to conclude that a cycle of the four quantities (108, 68, 54, 41) is the optimal control strategy, which is very close to the cycle (108, 70, 54, 42) actually played by a subject in 1 The session is over 40 rounds. The subject played the cycle of quantities (108, 70, 54, 42). This cycle yields an average payoff of 1520 which is well above Stackelberg leader payoff of 1458. The Stackelberg leader quantity is 54, the follow quantity is 27 (profit 728), the Cournot Nash equilibrium quantity 36 (payoff 1296). The computer is programmed to myopic best reply with some noise. The lower line in Figure 1 depicts the computer's sequence of actions. See Dürsch, Kolb, Oechssler and for details of the game and the experiment. an experiment discussed above.
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Our approach in this paper bears some resemblance with the literature on long-run and short-run players (sometimes referred to also as long-lived and short-lived players) in infinitely repeated games (see Fudenberg, Kreps and Maskin, 1990 , Fudenberg and Levine, 1989 , 1994 . In this literature a long-run optimizer faces a sequence of static best reply players who play only once. This is different from our model, in which the short-run player plays a best reply to the previous period's action of the opponent. Nevertheless, this literature on reputation in repeated games is close in spirit since it recognizes how players attempt to manipulate the opponents' learning process and try to "teach" them how to play. As Fudenberg and Levine (1998, Chapter 8.11) point out, strategic teaching has been studied in repeated games with rational players but it is less prominent in learning theory. Camerer, Ho and Chong (2002, 2006 ) study adaptive experienceweighted attraction learning of players in repeated games but allow for sophisticated players who respond optimally to their forecasts of all others' behavior. Their focus is on estimating such learning models with experimental data. There are only a few theoretical papers on learning in games in which players follow different learning theories (Schipper, 2006, Hehenkamp and Kaarbøe (2006) , Matros, 2004, Gale and Rosenthal, 1999) . They focus on the evolutionary selection or relative success of differing boundedly rational learning rules.
The next section presents the general results. In Section 3 we discuss the cyclic example. We conclude with a discussion in Section 4. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
General Results
There are two players, a manipulator and a puppet. Let X, Y be two nonempty compact subsets of R. We denote by x ∈ X y (resp. y t ∈ Y xt ) the manipulator's (resp. puppet's) action, where X y (resp. Y x ) is an upper hemi-continuous compact valued correspondence from Y to 2 X (resp. X to 2 Y ). That is, a player's set of actions may depend on the opponent's action.
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Let m : X × Y −→ R (resp. p : Y × X −→ R) be the manipulator's (resp. puppet's) one-period payoff function. We write m(x t , y t ) for the payoff obtained by the manipulator if he plays x t and the puppet plays y t (analogous for the puppet). We assume that each player's payoff function is bounded.
Y be the puppet's best reply correspondence. Moreover, define the puppet's best reply function b : X −→ Y as a selection of the best reply correspondence, i.e., b(x) ∈ B(x) for any x ∈ X. Following lemma will be useful for the study of the optimization problem of the manipulator when the puppet is a myopic best reply player.
Lemma 1 If X y is u.h.c. and compact valued, m is u.s.c. on X × Y , and p is u.s.c. and strictly quasi-concave in y on Y x given x ∈ X, thenm := m(·, b(·)) is u.s.c. on X × X and X x := X b(x) is u.h.c. and compact valued.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
In light of Lemma 1 we will assume that m is u.s.c. on X×Y and p is u.s.c. and strictly quasi-concave on Y . Note that latter assumption is probably stronger than necessary (see the discussion in Section 4). Note that we do not impose any concavity assumption on m.
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, ..., T . T may be infinity. We assume that the puppet is a myopic best reply player with a given best reply function. That is, his action at t is
for t = 1, ... and given y 0 ∈ Y .
We can now consider the following Ramsey-type dynamic optimization problem
s.t. x −1 ∈ X defined by y 0 = b(x 1 ) given y 0 , x t ∈ X x t−1 for t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1, and 0 < δ < 1.
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By standard arguments in dynamic programming (see Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989), the value function or Bellman equation satisfies
for n = 1, 2, ... with M 0 ≡ 0, and
Lemma 2 If X y is u.h.c. and compact valued, m is u.s.c. on X × Y , and p is u.s.c. and strictly quasi-concave in y on Y x given x ∈ X, then for n = 0, ... the value function M n is u.s.c. on X
In light of Lemma 2, optimal control strategies exist. We can replace the sup in equation (2) and (3) by max. Let G n (x) be the set of arg max in equation (2) (resp. (3)) if n is finite (resp. infinite). G n (x) is the set of all optimal decisions in the first period when the problem's horizon consists of n periods. Let g n be a selection of G n , andḡ n and g n be the maximum and minimum selection of G n . If T is finite, we restrict attention to Markovian control strategies defined as sequence of transition functions
T is infinity, then we restrict us to stationary Markovian control strategies (d, d, ...) with d : X −→ X and d(x) ∈ X x . Such optimal control strategies exist but there may exist other optimal control strategies as well.
Before we can study properties of the solution for our dynamic optimization problem, we need to state some definitions and preliminary results. The first definitions concerns a common notion of strategic complements (resp. strategic substitutes). A function
This function has strictly increasing (resp. strictly decreasing) differences if the inequality holds strictly. The function f has strongly increasing (resp. strongly decreasing) differences in (x, y) on X y × Y if X, Y ⊆ R + , X y is a continuous, convex and compact valued correspondence on Y , f is of class C 1 , and for all y , y ∈ Y with y > y ,
A payoff function has positive (resp. negative) externalities if it is increasing (resp. decreasing) in the opponent's action.
The following lemma shows how above conditions on the game's payoff functions m and p translate into properties of the objective functionm. These properties will allow us later on to show properties of optimal control strategies. Note that by (i) whenever m and p have the same monotone differences, thenm has increasing differences.
Lemma 3 (i) The following table establishes a relationship between increasing and decreasing differences of m, p, andm:
If and then m has p hasm has strongly strictly incr. decr strongly strictly incr. decr. strongly strictly incr. decr.
(ii) The following table establishes a relationship between positive and negative externalities of m, increasing or decreasing differences of p, and monotonicity ofm(x t+1 , x t ) in x t :
If and then m has p hasm(x t+1 , xt) is positive negative increasing decreasing increasing decreasing
With this lemma, the properties of solution to our dynamic programming problem are know from analogous results on Ramsey-type problems by Amir (1996) (see Puterman, 1994, for related results). Below we state the results adapted to our language (Propositions 1 to 3). The proofs follow directly from above lemmata and Amir (1996) .
Proposition 1 The following conclusions hold: (i)
If and and then m has p has Xy is Mn is on X positive negative increasing decreasing expanding contracting increasing decreasing externalities differences
If and and then m has p has Xy is strictly incr. decr. strongly incr. decr. ascending descending incr. decr.
This proposition states that both n-period value functions and n-period optimal control strategies are monotone in the previous period's action (n + 1) of the manipulator.
The next proposition shows that the n+1-horizon optimal control strategy (that gives the first period's action) is larger than the n-horizon optimal control strategy. That is, optimal control strategies are monotone over time. Moreover, denote byḡ n (·, δ) (resp. g n (·, δ)) be the largest (resp. lowest) optimal control strategy for the n-horizon problem when the discount rate is δ. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 shows that the optimal control strategy is increasing in the discount rate.
Proposition 2 (i)
[m has negative externalities and p has decreasing differences] and X y is expanding, thenḡ n+1 ≥ḡ n and g n+1 ≥ g n for n = 1, ...
Proposition 3 strengthens previous results to strict monotone optimal control strategies. This comes at the cost of assuming strongly increasing or decreasing differences (and hence differentiability of the payoff functions).
Proposition 3 Let g n be any interior optimal strategy for n = 1, ..., i.e. g n (x) is in the interior of X x .
(i) If both m and p have strongly increasing differences or strongly decreasing differences and X y is ascending, then g n (x ) > g n (x ) if x > x , n = 1, ...
(ii) If [m has positive externalities and strongly increasing differences, and p has strongly increasing differences] or [m has negative externalities and strongly decreasing differences, and p has decreasing differences] and X y is expanding, then g n+1 (x) > g n (x) for all x ∈ X and n = 1, ...
(iii) If both m and p have strongly increasing differences or strongly decreasing differences and δ > δ , δ , δ ∈ (0, 1), then g n (·, δ ) > g n (·, δ ), n = 1, ...
We want to compare actions and payoffs resulting from optimal control strategies with Nash equilibrium strategies and payoffs in the one-shot game. Let (x e , y e ) denote a pure strategy Nash equilibrium profile in the one-shot game with the manipulator's largest or smallest Nash equilibrium action. Denote by M * n the n-period discounted sum of stage-game Nash equilibrium payoffs to the manipulator corresponding to the n-period play of such Nash equilibrium (x e , y e ).
Proposition 4 Suppose that X y is expanding, both m and p have decreasing differences and m has negative externalities (resp. both m and p have increasing differences and m has positive externalities). If y 0 ≤ y e (resp. y 0 ≥ y e ) then there exists a transition path induced by n-optimal control strategies g n , n = 1, ... and y 0 = b(x −1 ) such that for any element x n for the transition path we have x n ≥ x e and for the corresponding payoffs holds
We are also interested in a comparison of actions and payoffs between the manipulator and the puppet. Such comparison makes only sense when payoff functions are symmetric. Let P n (x) denote the n-period discounted payoff to the puppet if the manipulator follows an n-period optimal control strategy. The next proposition shows that in games with decreasing differences and negative externalities (e.g. some Cournot duopoly) the manipulator is better off than the puppet if the puppet's initial action is not to large. This is remniscent of Stackelberg outcomes, where the manipulator takes a role similar to the Stackelberg leader and the puppet is the Stackelberg follower.
Proposition 5 Suppose that payoff functions m and p are symmetric, i.e. m satisfies all properties of p. Suppose further that p (and thus m) has decreasing differences, negative externalities, X y is expanding, and b has a slope above −1. If y 0 ≤ y e then there exists a transition path induced by n-optimal control strategies g n , n = 1, ... and
The proof is contained in the appendix. The assumption that b has a slope above −1 is probably stronger than necessary. In symmetric games considered here it implies a unique Nash equilibrium which is symmetric.
The Cyclic Example
Consider the Cournot duopoly discussed in the introduction. In this section we want to show that a cycle is optimal in this example. Since the game does not satisfy decreasing differences everywhere, previous results are not applicable. To see this note that for instance π(100, 0) − π(50, 0) = 800 − 2900 < π(100, 100) − π(50, 100) = −100 − 50 while Consider now a "smooth" version of the game with symmetric payoff functions given below, in which we do not insist on a non-negative price:
This game has strongly decreasing differences and negative externalities everywhere. The graph of this payoff function is identical to the graph of the original payoff function for the range of actions x ∈ [0, 109 − y]. For this range of x the original game satisfies strictly decreasing differences. Similarly, for any n we can find the range of x n+1 where the smooth n-period's objective function coincides with the original n-period's objective function.
We want to prove that a cycle of four actions is optimal. The idea of the proof is as follows: Since we consider a finite repetition of the game, we can use backwards induction. By our previous results any optimal sequence of actions must be monotonically decreasing over time as long as x n+1 is in the range where the n-objective function coincides with the smooth n-objective function. We show that after eight periods this assumption is violated for the fourth period. We show that this means that there must be cycle if n = 8, and it turns out that the 4-cycle is optimal. Using our monotonicity results, we extend the result to n > 8.
For n = 1, 2, ..., 8, we write down recursively the n-objective functions Π n (x n+1 ),
and solve for the n-optimal control strategy g n (x n+1 ) under the assumption that x n+1 is in the range where the n-objective function coincides with the smooth n-objective function: Note that if x n+1 is outside the respective for range for which the n-objective function coincides with the smooth n-objective function, then there is a corner solution g n (x n+1 ) = 108 since the graph of the n-objective function has the typical shape depicted in Figure 3 . Note further that if x n = 108 then Π n (x n+1 ) = k for all x n+1 > 1. That is, if x n = 108 then the n-payoff is constant in x n+1 . So it does not matter what the puppet plays in n. In particular, the puppet could play a best reply to x 1 , the last period's action of the manipulator. We conclude that in the n-period problem, if x n+1 is outside the respective for range for which the n-objective function coincides with the smooth n-objective function, then there is an optimal cycle which starts with x n = 108.
In the experiment mentioned in the introduction, the initial puppet's action was set to y = 40. That is, if we consider the n = 8 period problem, already in the 0-period's x 9 = 28 (defined by 40 = b(x 9 )) would be outside the range for which the 8-objective function coincides with the smooth 8-objective function. Hence there must be at least an 8-cycle in the 8-period problem.
Suppose there is such 8-cycle in the 8-period problem, then by above arguments x 8 = 108. Using the n-optimal control strategies for n = 1, 2, ..., 7 above, we can compute the optimal path of quantities of the manipulator: We note that n = 4 is the latest period, for which x n+1 = x 5 / ∈ [56.264, 108] (54.964 < 56.264), a contradiction that the 8-cycle being optimal for the n-period problem. Hence a smaller cycle must be optimal. Indeed, when we compute all smaller cycles using noptimal control strategies g n and starting values 108, then we find that the 4-cycle is optimal.
Consider now any problems with n > 8. Suppose that a 4-cycle is not optimal anymore for such problem with period's larger than 8. Then we must have that x 5 in optimal path for the n > 8 problem is strictly lower than x 5 for the 8-cycle. Otherwise, by previous arguments the 4-cycle would be optimal. This could only be true if x 8 in the optimal path of n > 8 period problem is strictly larger than x 8 in the 8-cycle, since by Proposition 1 for n = 1, ... we have that g n is monotone increasing in x n+1 . However, already for the 8-cycle we have x 8 = 108, the largest undominated action. Hence, x 8 in the optimal path for the n > 8 period problem can not be larger, which implies that for n = 5 we must have that x 5 / ∈ [56.264, 108] (54.964 < 56.264), a contradiction to the assertion the 4-cycle is not optimal. This completes the proof that 4-cycles are optimal.
What happens in there is a finite repetition of the game for which the number of periods can not be divided by 4? For all problems with less then 8 periods it is easy to verify that in the last 4 periods the 4-cycle is optimal. In any previous periods there is an optimal path monotone over periods since the range-assumption won't be violated. For problems with periods larger than 8 that can not divided by 4, the 4-cycle is optimal for the last 4m for m = 1, 2, ... period. For any previous periods, there is an optimal path monotone over periods since the range-assumption won't be violated.
The result of optimal cycles may be generalized to a larger class of Cournot games in which we insist on a non-smooth lower bounded for the price although the optimal cycle length may depend on the parameters of the game.
Discussion
In this article we assumed that actions are one-dimensional although lattice programming allows usually to prove results even if strategies are multi-dimensional. The crucial assumption required is that payoffs are supermodular in actions. If we assume that both m and p are supermodular in actions, thenm may not be supermodular even if b(x) is supermodular in x. E.g. the composition of m(·, −b(x)) may not be supermodular in x on X.
We used the cardinal property of decreasing and increasing differences to obtain our results. It is unlikely that our results extend to the weaker order notions of (dual) single crossing property. The manipulator's objective function is a weighted sum of one-period payoff functions. It is well know that the sum of functions each satisfying the singlecrossing property may not satisfy the single-crossing property (Topkis, 1998) .
In Lemma 1 we assume that p is strict quasi-concave in y. This is probably too strong. We require that m is u.s.c. and b continuous, since if b is just u.s.c. the compositionm may not be a u.s.c. function. E.g., if b is a u.s.c. function then −b is a l.s.c. function. Hence m(·, −b(·)) may not be a u.s.c. function. It would suffice to obtain a continuous selection b from B. By Michael's Selection Theorem we would require that B is a convex-valued l.h.c. correspondence. The Theorem of the Maximum just yields a u.h.c. correspondence. Convex-valued-ness requires quasi-concavity of p anyway. So strict quasi-concavity of p may be weakened to quasi-concavity and a slightly stronger continuity property.
In our model we required the initial action of the puppet to be a best reply to some action of the manipulator. This may be quite restrictive when period 0 is viewed as the first period. Why should the puppet start already with a rationalizable action? After all a motivation for learning theories is to study whether boundedly rational learning could converge to a rational action without assuming that players start already with it. Yet, we believe that this assumption is not restrictive because myopic best reply players are programmed to best replies. So no matter what they play, it should be a best reply to some of the opponent's action. This is intuitive especially if we view period 0 not as the first period.
At the first glance, the optimal cycle in the Cournot duopoly with a non-negative price may look surprising. However, note that for instance it is easy to see that the optimal control strategy against a myopic best reply player in a matching pennies game involves a two-cycle. Such cycles are due to the "mechanistic" nature of myopic best reply. It seems quite unrealistic that a player even if he is adaptive should not recognize cycles after some time. Aoyagi (1996) studies repeated two-player games with adaptive players who are able to recognize patterns such as cycles in the path of play. Indeed, it may be worthwhile to extend our analysis and allow the best reply player to recognize cycles.
We view our analysis as a first step of studying strategic control of adaptive learning. We envision several possible extensions. First, one may want extend our analysis to n-player games in order to allow for several manipulators and puppets. Second, myopic best reply is just one adaptive learning theory. Our analysis should be extended to other (adaptive) learning theories as well such as fictitious play, reinforcement learning, imitation, trail & error learning, etc. or better to classes of (adaptive) learning theories. Third, (adaptive) players may make mistakes. Would cycles in our Cournot example survive if the myopic best reply player would tremble to any quantity with a tiny but strict positive probability? Forth, we assumed that the manipulator knows that the puppet plays myopic best reply but in reality such knowledge may be missing. Could the manipulator learn the learning theory of the opponent (and the nature of the noise if any)?
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. If p is u.s.c. in y on Y x given x ∈ X, then by the Weierstrass Theorem an argmax exist. By the Theorem of the Maximum, the argmax correspondence is u.h.c. and compact-valued in x. Since p is strictly quasi-concave, the argmax is unique. Hence the u.h.c. best reply correspondence is a continuous best reply function. Since m is u.s.c. and b is continuous, we have thatm is u.s.c..
Proof of Lemma 2. Under the conditions of the Lemma we have by Lemma 1 thatm is u.s.c. on X × X. By the Theorem of the Maximum (Berge, 1963) , M 1 is u.s.c. on X. If M n−1 is u.s.c. on X andm is u.s.c. on X × X, then since δ ≥ 0,m(x , x) + δM n−1 (x ) is u.s.c. in x on X. Again, by the Theorem of the Maximum, M n is u.s.c. on X. Thus by induction M n is u.s.c. on X for any n.
Let L be an operator on the space of bounded u.s.c. functions on X defined by LM ∞ (x) = sup x ∈Xx {m(x , x) + δM ∞ (x )}. This function is u.s.c. by the Theorem of the Maximum. Hence L maps bounded u.s.c. functions to bounded u.s.c. functions. T is a contraction mapping by Blackwell's sufficiency conditions (Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, 1989) . Since the space of bounded u.s.c. functions is a complete subset of the complete metric space of bounded functions with the sup distance, it follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem that L has a unique fixed point M ∞ which is u.s.c. on X.
Proof of Lemma 3. We state the proof just for one case. The proof of the other cases follow analogously.
(i) If p has strongly decreasing differences in (y, x) on Y × X, then by Topkis (1998) b is strictly decreasing in x on X. Since m has strongly decreasing differences in (x, y) on X × Y , m(·, ·) = m(·, b(·)) must have strongly increasing differences on X × X.
(ii) If p has decreasing differences in (y, x) on Y ×X, then by Topkis (1998) b is decreasing in x on X. Hence, if m has negative externalities,m(x , x) = m(x , b(x)) must be increasing in x.
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that both m and p have decreasing differences and m has negative externalities. We focus on the Nash equilibrium (x e , y e ) in which the manipulator plays her smallest Nash equilibrium action (the proof with the largest Nash equilibrium action is analogous, just replace g n byḡ n ). First, consider T = 1. Since y 0 = b(x −1 ) and p has decreasing differences, we have y 0 ≤ y e if and only if x −1 ≥ x e . Since m has decreasing differences we have g 1 (x e ) = x e and g 1 (x −1 ) ≥ x e for x −1 ≥ x e . This follows from Proposition 1. Consider now T > 1. Since m has negative externalities, p has decreasing differences and X y is expanding, it follows from Proposition 2 that g n+1 (x −1 ) ≥ g n (x −1 ) for n = 1, .... Hence we conclude g n+1 (x −1 ) ≥ x e for n = 1, ... if y 0 ≤ y e .
Suppose now to the contrary that max T −1 t=0 δ tm (x t , x t−1 ) < T −1 t=0 δ t m * , where m * is the manipulator's payoff from the one-shot Nash equilibrium (x e , y e ). Since by Lemma 3, m(x t , x t−1 ) is increasing in x t−1 we must have thatm(x e , x t−1 ) ≥m(x e , x e ) for any t = 0, .... Hence the manipulator could improve his payoff by deviating to her one-shot Nash equilibrium action. Thus we have a contradiction to max T −1 t=0 δ tm (x t , x t−1 ) being the payoff from the optimal control strategy.
The proof is analogous if both m and p have increasing differences and m has positive externalities.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Since the game is symmetric and b has a slope above −1, the stage-game Nash equilibrium is unique and symmetric (see Vives, 1999 , Section 2.3.2, Remark 17). Note that by Proposition 4, if y 0 ≤ y e then M n (x −1 ) ≥ M * n with y 0 = b(x −1 ). Also by Proposition 4, if y 0 ≤ y e then for any element x n of the transition path induced by the optimal control strategies g n we have x n ≥ x e . Since p has decreasing differences and the unique Nash equilibrium is symmetric, y n ≤ y e . We want to show that p(x e , x e ) ≥ p(y n , x n ). Suppose to the contrary that p(x e , x e ) < p(y n , x n ). If y 0 ≤ y e we have by Proposition 4, x n ≥ x e , n = 1, .... By negative externalities, p(y n , x n ) ≤ p(y n , x e ). Hence p(x e , x e ) < p(y n , x e ), a contradiction to x e being the Nash equilibrium action. Thus M n (x −1 ) ≥ M * n ≥ P n (x −1 ).
